After Katrina: A Critical Look at FEMA\u27s Failure to Provide Housing for Victims of Natural Disasters by Pierre, John K. & Stephenson, Gail S.
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 68 | Number 2
Winter 2008
After Katrina: A Critical Look at FEMA's Failure to
Provide Housing for Victims of Natural Disasters
John K. Pierre
Gail S. Stephenson
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
John K. Pierre and Gail S. Stephenson, After Katrina: A Critical Look at FEMA's Failure to Provide Housing for Victims of Natural
Disasters, 68 La. L. Rev. (2008)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol68/iss2/6
After Katrina: A Critical Look at FEMA's Failure to
Provide Housing for Victims of Natural Disasters
John K. Pierre*
Gail S. Stephenson**
Nature gone insane,
Homes hammered by the hurricane
Everybody's world changed,
After the storm.1
I. INTRODUCTION
On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina, "the costliest and one
of the five deadliest hurricanes ever to strike the United States,"
struck the northern Gulf Coast region, making initial landfall in
Louisiana, before moving across Mississippi and into Alabama.
2
Hundreds of thousands of people, many of them low-to-moderate-
income residents, were forced to evacuate their homes.
3
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1. HAWAIIAN STYLE BAND, After the Storm, on RHYTHM OF THE OCEAN
(Top Flight Records 1994).
2. RICHARD D. KNABB ET AL., NAT'L HURRICANE CTR., TROPICAL
CYCLONE REPORT: HURRICANE KATRINA 23-30 AUGUST 2005, at 1, 3, 4 (2005),
available at http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/pdf/TCR-AL 122005_Katrina.pdf.
3. Disaster Response, THE ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge), Oct. 23, 2005, at
Al. Because they were concentrated in the lowest-lying areas of New Orleans,
poor and black residents were disproportionately affected by Hurricane Katrina.
Elijah Anderson, Inadequate Responses, Limited Expectations, in REBUILDING
URBAN PLACES AFTER DISASTER: LESSONS FROM KATRINA 193, 195 (Eugenie L.
Birch & Susan M. Wachter eds., 2006) [hereinafter REBUILDING].
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Federal law, specifically, the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief
and Emergency Assistance Act (the Stafford Act),4 guarantees that
disaster victims will receive help through the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA). The Act sets forth the type of help
available and the conditions for obtaining that help, which may
include financial assistance to rent housing or the direct provision
of a trailer or mobile home.5 Soon after Hurricane Katrina struck,
Congress approved $62.3 billion in federal assistance to be
administered primarily by FEMA.6 Much of the $62 billion was
earmarked for the temporary housing needs of disaster victims.
7
Unfortunately for the victims of Hurricane Katrina, FEMA's
administration of that assistance left much to be desired.
FEMA has existed since 1979. In the twenty-six years before
Katrina, it has been charged with providing temporary housing to
victims of numerous major disasters-other hurricanes,
earthquakes, wildfires, and civil unrest. One might have expected
that by the time Katrina struck, FEMA would have learned from
these experiences and developed expertise at averting housing
crises.
One might also have expected FEMA to be prepared for a
catastrophic hurricane on the Gulf Coast. In a Time magazine
article in 2000, Joe Suhayda, a water resources expert at Louisiana
State University (LSU), warned that a Category 5 hurricane
"barreling out of the Gulf of Mexico" would cause Lake
Pontchartrain to overflow, "essentially destroy[ing] New
Orleans." 8 An October 2001 article in Scientific American cited
other LSU scientists in predicting the "potential drowning of New
Orleans" by a hurricane's direct hit, which the author termed
"inevitable." 9 For five days in July 2004, officials from fifty local,
state, federal, and volunteer organizations that deal with
emergencies, including FEMA, participated in "Hurricane Pam,"
an emergency preparedness drill predicated on a Category 3
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5207 (2006 & Supp. 2007).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 5174 (2006).
6. Gerald Shields, $51.8 Billion More Approved, THE ADVOCATE (Baton
Rouge), Sept. 9, 2005, at Al.
7. Id.
8. Adam Cohen, The Big Easy on the Brink, TIME, July 10, 2000, at 91.
9. Mark Fischetti, Drowning New Orleans, SCI. AM., Oct. 2001, at 78.
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hurricane striking southeastern Louisiana. 10 The drill's purpose
was to gain information to help FEMA and other agencies plan and
prepare for the inevitable damage and subsequent events that
would result from a real hurricane." One of the anticipated
problems was "[c]reating housing options, including trailer or tent
villages, for the thousands likely to be left homeless for months
after the storm."
'12
Did FEMA learn anything from past disasters? Did FEMA
heed the dire predictions of scientists regarding the potential
damage to Louisiana from a hurricane? Did it learn anything from
Hurricane Pam? Did FEMA use information gained from that
exercise to take precautions that would have alleviated some of the
tragic suffering still felt by residents two years after Katrina?
Thousands of residents of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama
whose homes were destroyed or rendered uninhabitable or
inaccessible as a direct result of the storm would answer those
questions with a resounding chorus of "No." Barbara R. Arnwine,
Executive Director of the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights
Under Law, testified before a House Committee in December 2005
that several months after Hurricane Katrina struck, thousands of
disaster victims still had not received desperately needed assistance
from FEMA and, as a result, continued to suffer harm. 13 On the
10. See U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DISASTER ASSISTANCE: BETTER
PLANNING NEEDED FOR HOUSING VICTIMS OF CATASTROPHIC DISASTERS 25
(2007), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0788.pdf [hereinafter GAO
REPORT]; Jan Moller, Hurricane Scenario Tests Officials' Disaster Readiness,
TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), July 24, 2004, at Nat'l 2.
11. Mark Schleifstein, In Case of Emergency, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New
Orleans), July 20, 2004, at Nat'l 1.
12. Id. Post-hurricane housing problems should not have been that difficult
for FEMA to predict. A 1998 report on housing issues involving low-income
groups following the Loma Prieta earthquake in California stated, "[G]iven the
national increase in homelessness, poverty, and demographic diversity, in
combination with the decline of affordable housing, such post-disaster housing
crises undoubtedly will be seen again." Brenda D. Phillips, Sheltering and
Housing of Low-Income and Minority Groups in Santa Cruz County After the
Loma Prieta Earthquake, in THE LOMA PRIETA, CALIFORNIA, EARTHQUAKE OF
OCTOBER 17, 1989: RECOVERY, MITIGATION, AND RECONSTRUCTION D17, D27
(Joanne M. Nigg ed., 1998).
13. U.S. H. Select Bipartisan Comm. to Investigate the Preparation for and
Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Cong. 6 (2005) (testimony of Barbara R.
2008] 445
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one-year anniversary of the hurricane, David Scott, United States
Representative from Georgia, stated, "[M]uch of the region
remains devastated, government neglect and inefficiency persists,
and residents continue to suffer from inadequate housing, health
care, and other basic services ... . The United States
Government Accountability Office concluded in a February 2007
report that FEMA's "various catastrophic planning efforts prior to"
the hurricane were incomplete and that FEMA was "overwhelmed"
and "faced several challenges in providing temporary housing" to
storm victims.15  To many, the failures of FEMA seemed
unimaginable for a government capable, in a short period of time,
of sending massive aid halfway around the world to tsunami
victims or of deploying and housing hundreds of thousands of
troops in Iraq.
Because the United States Treasury issued temporary housing
assistance checks but FEMA mailed the instructions separately,
many victims did not know the funds were to be spent only for
housing. Many victims had already spent the funds for other needs
when the instructions arrived. 16  Thus, they found themselves
potentially indebted to the federal government for using aid
received from FEMA "to replace the necessities of life."'17 FEMA
denied assistance to many other impoverished disaster victims
"based upon a mechanical or arbitrary presumption of fraud" that
arguably had no factual basis. 8  Arnwine further testified that
"[a]fter already seeing their communities, homes, and possessions
destroyed, disaster victims [we]re now forced to sleep on the floors
Amwine, Executive Director, Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under
Law), available at http://www.lawyerscommittee.org/2005website/home/images
/features/testimonyl2.6.05.pdf [hereinafter Arnwine]. Much of Arnwine's
testimony was based on the complaint filed in McWaters v. FEMA, see infra
notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
14. Rep. Scott Statement on Anniversary of Hurricane Katrina, U.S. FED.
NEWS, Aug. 29, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 15084285.
15. GAO REPORT, supra note 10, at 25.
16. Sheila Crowley, Where Is Home? Housing for Low-Income People After
the 2005 Hurricanes, in THERE Is No SUCH THING AS A NATURAL DISASTER
121, 133 (Chester Hartman & Gregory D. Squires eds., 2006).
17. Arnwine, supra note 13, at 6.
18. Id.
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of relatives, on pavements, in cars, and in tents, or [we]re bounced
from shelter to shelter, seemingly abandoned and forgotten by
FEMA."' 9 Newspapers also reported victims living in barns and
gutted houses, under dangerous and unhealthy conditions.
2 0
Each day housing assistance was denied or delayed to them,
Katrina victims suffered unimaginable harm. Over 200,000 people
were displaced and evacuated to distant places around the
21
country, many to unfamiliar regions without housing assistance
or the means to reunite with their families or to return to their
communities. 22  FEMA's failure and in some cases refusal to
provide housing assistance to Katrina victims resulted in problems
that still linger, including stress, anxiety, hunger, and instability. 23
19. Id.
20. Ellen Barry, Homeless Katrina Victims Brace for Winter, THE
ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge), Oct. 28, 2005, at A6; Karen Turni Bazile, Out in the
Cold, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Jan. 23, 2006, at Metro 1; Susan
Roesgen, Katrina Victims: 'Living in Barns', CNN.COM., Dec. 13, 2005,
http://www.cnn.com/2005/US/12/13/katrina.trailers/.
21. JOHN MCQUAID & MARK SCHLEIFSTEIN, PATH OF DESTRUCTION: THE
DEVASTATION OF NEW ORLEANS AND THE COMING AGE OF SUPERSTORMS 335
(2006).
22. Anderson, supra note 3, at 194. Four months after Katrina, over
250,000 evacuees continued to live in other states, and almost that many "were
displaced within Louisiana and Mississippi." John Valery White, The
Persistence of Race Politics and the Restraint of Recovery in Katrina's Wake, in
AFTER THE STORM: BLACK INTELLECTUALS EXPLORE THE MEANING OF
HURRICANE KATRINA 41, 46 (David Dante Troutt ed., 2006) [hereinafter AFTER
THE STORM]. See also Tatsha Robertson, Many Katrina Victims Stranded Far
Away from a Family Holiday, BOSTON GLOBE COMMON DREAMS NEWS CTR.,
Nov. 24, 2005, http://www.commondreams.org/headlines05/1124-03.htm.
23. OVERVIEW OF BASELINE SURVEY RESULTS: HURRICANE KATRINA
ADVISORY GROUP (2006), available at http://hurricanekatrina.med.harvard.edu/
pdf/baseline-report%25208-25-06.pdf [hereinafter HARVARD STUDY]; Mary
Foster, Katrina May Still Be Claiming Victims, THE ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge),
June 3, 2007, at A28. In a recent letter to the editor, one elderly, disabled
Louisiana resident who had received no help from FEMA stated plaintively,
"My wife and I are doomed. I see no hope." Robert J. Trosclair, Letter to the
Editor, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), May 31, 2007, at Metro-Editorial 6.
Almost two years after Hurricane Katrina, a resident displaced from a New
Orleans housing project burst into tears during a town hall meeting on housing,
sobbing, "We are good citizens! We vote! We are tired; we are tired." Allen
Johnson Jr., N.O. Frustration Surfaces, THE ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge), July 8,
2007, at A26.
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As one critic stated, FEMA's failure "compounded the hardshi,
confusion, and trauma of the people most in need of assistance."' 2
Those lucky enough to receive FEMA housing vouchers had to
deal with FEMA-shy landlords who refused to take the vouchers
because of FEMA's "broken promises, unreasonable deadlines and
mind-numbing bureaucracy., 25 Ronald D. Utt, a former senior
official at the Department of Housing and Urban Development,
commented about FEMA's failure to provide necessary relief to
the hurricane's victims as follows: "This is not incompetence.
This is willful. That is the only way I can explain it.",
26
This article reviews the impact of disasters on victims,
particularly low-income victims, whose homes are destroyed or
rendered uninhabitable or inaccessible as a result of a disaster,
when the federal government fails to carry out its statutorily
mandated duty toward those victims. The article further analyzes
the issues that may arise when lawyers attempt to seek legal
redress against FEMA on behalf of those made homeless by
disasters in the United States and suggests changes that could be
implemented by the federal government to prevent a recurrence of
such issues in the future.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE STAFFORD ACT AND ITS RELEVANCE TO
HOUSING FOR VICTIMS OF NATURAL DISASTERS
When catastrophic natural disasters occur, the principal federal
statute providing assistance to state and local governments, as well
as to individuals, is the Stafford Act. Under the Stafford Act,
FEMA is the federal agency principally charged to care for
Americans who are victims of natural disasters.
27
FEMA was established in 1979 by President Jimmy Carter to
"provide a single point of accountability for the federal
24. Crowley, supra note 16, at 126.
25. Editorial, Solutions Before Deadlines, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans),
Dec. 2, 2005, at Metro-Editorial 6.
26. Eric Lipton, $11 Million a Day Spent on Hotels for Storm Relief N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 13, 2005, at Al.
27. 42 U.S.C. § 5195 (2006).
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government's disaster response." 28 Carter hoped the new agency
would end criticism of the government's handling of emergency
management. 29 The mission of FEMA as set forth in the Stafford
Act is to assist the efforts of the states "in expediting the rendering
of aid, assistance, and emergency services, and the reconstruction
and rehabilitation of devastated areas." 30 FEMA assists state and
local governments "in carrying out their responsibilities to alleviate
the suffering and damage" that result from major disasters and
emergencies. 3 1  FEMA, among other things, provides federal
assistance programs for public and private losses and needs
resulting from disasters.
32
Before FEMA can render assistance in any particular place and
time, a governor of a state must request that the President of the
United States declare the existence of a major disaster or
emergency in the area.33 The governor's request must be based on
a determination that "the disaster is of such severity and magnitude
that effective response is beyond the capabilities of the State," and
local governments affected by the disaster and that "[flederal
assistance is necessary., 34 Based on that request, the President
may declare that a major disaster or emergency exists, thus
triggering the availability of FEMA assistance.
If the President declares a major disaster or emergency, he or
she may (1) direct federal agencies to use their authorities and
resources granted under federal law to support state and local
assistance efforts; (2) coordinate all disaster efforts between
federal agencies and state and local governments; (3) provide
technical and advisory assistance to state and local governments;
(4) help state and local governments distribute medicine, food,
other consumables, and emergency assistance; and (5) provide
28. Tom Mathews et al., What Went Wrong, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 7, 1992, at
22, 24.
29. TED STEINBERG, ACTS OF GOD: THE UNNATURAL HISTORY OF NATURAL
DISASTER IN AMERICA 185 (2000).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 5121(a)(2) (2006).
31. § 5121(b).
32. § 5121(b)(6).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 5170 (2006).
34. Id.
35. Id.
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"accelerated" federal assistance and support. 36  Processing of
applications for temporary housing assistance and for the
distribution of federal benefits pursuant to the Stafford Act must be
done in "an equitable and impartial manner, without discrimination
on the grounds of race, color, religion, nationality, sex, age,
disability, English proficiency, or economic status."
37
The Act also authorizes federal aid to individuals and
households. In particular, the Act provides that the President may
provide temporary housing assistance to individuals and
households "who are displaced from their pre-disaster primary
residences or whose pre-disaster primary residences are rendered
uninhabitable, or with respect to individuals with disabilities,
rendered inaccessible or uninhabitable, as a result of damage
caused by a major disaster." 38 More specifically, the Act outlines
two types of temporary housing assistance-financial assistance
and direct services. 39 This aid is sometimes referred to as Section
408 assistance. 40  Financial assistance provides funds to rent
alternate housing accommodations, as well as to pay utility bills,
excluding telephone service.4' Direct assistance provides
temporary housing units when there may be a lack of available
housing resources for rent.42  Under the Act, the President is
empowered to determine the appropriate types of housing
assistance to be provided, based upon factors such as "cost
effectiveness, convenience to the individuals and households, and
such other factors as the President may consider appropriate.
'
"
43
The purpose of financial assistance, sometimes known as
"rental assistance," is to enable victims of disasters "to rent
alternate housing accommodations, existing rental units,
manufactured housing, recreational vehicles, or other readily
36. § 5170a.
37. 42 U.S.C.A. § 5151(a) (Supp. 2007); see also 44 C.F.R. § 206.11(b)
(2006).
38. 42 U.S.C.A. § 5174(b)(1) (Supp. 2007).
39. § 5174(a)(1).
40. This provision was enacted as Public Law 93-288, Title IV, § 408
(1988).
41. § 5174(c)(1)(A)(i).
42. § 5174(c)(1)(B)(i).
43. § 5174(b)(2)(A).
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fabricated dwellings," and to pay for utilities, other than telephone
service. 4  FEMA commonly administers the rental assistance
program by issuing a check to eligible individuals for an initial
three-month period to cover the cost of rent and thereafter
providing assistance beyond the three-month period upon proof of
need.45
Direct assistance, sometimes known as "trailer assistance,"
enables disaster victims to receive actual temporary housing units,
such as trailers or mobile homes.46 Trailer assistance is available
to victims who cannot use rental assistance because of, for
example, a lack of rental housing.47 The Stafford Act authorizes
rental and trailer assistance, which is intended to be "temporary,"
to both pre-disaster renters and homeowners. Under the Act,
temporary housing assistance is available for eighteen months from
the date that the President declared a disaster but may be extended
beyond that time.48  Contrary to popular belief, however,
individual recipients of housing assistance are not guaranteed
housing assistance for the full eighteen months from the date of
declaration of a major disaster.49
In addition to housing assistance, the Stafford Act authorizes
the President to provide financial assistance to address "other
needs.",50  Specifically, the Act states that the President may
provide financial assistance to victims of a major disaster "to meet
disaster-related medical, dental, and funeral expenses,' or "to
address personal property, transportation, and other necessary
expenses or serious needs resulting from the major disaster." 52 By
regulation, FEMA requires applicants for other needs assistance to
apply for a disaster loan from the Small Business Administration
44. § 5174(c)(1)(A)(i).
45. After Katrina, FEMA provided checks for $2,358 for three months of
rent, based on "the national Fair Market Rent for a two-bedroom unit."
Crowley, supra note 16, at 132.
46. § 5174(c)(1)(B)(i).
47. Id.
48. 44 C.F.R. § 206.110(e) (2006).
49. § 206.114(a).
50. § 5174(e).
51. § 5174(e)(1).
52. § 5174(e)(2).
2008]
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(SBA) to cover the expenses for which such assistance is sought.53
One criterion of eligibility for other needs assistance is denial or
inadequacy of an SBA loan.
54
The financial assistance to address other needs is known as the
Individual and Family Grant Program (IFGP). In relation to both
other needs assistance and temporary housing assistance, the Act
provides that no "individual or household shall receive financial
assistance greater than $25,000,"' 5 adjusted for inflation, "with
respect to a single major disaster."56
The Act and corresponding regulations address duplicative
benefits. 57  Hence, the Act requires that the President, in
consultation with the head of each federal agency providing
assistance under the Act, ensure that no one receives assistance for
any part of a loss that is covered by any other source. 58  For
example, FEMA regulations require an applicant for assistance
under the Act to apply for insurance proceeds to cover any insured
loss.59  The regulations state that assistance for one temporary
residence will generally be provided for each pre-disaster
household. 60  This pre-disaster household provision is known as
the "shared-household rule."
61
In addition to the standard temporary housing assistance
explained previously, FEMA can provide emergency shelter under
the Stafford Act when it is essential to meet immediate threats to
life and property resulting from a major disaster.62 This short-term
relief is sometimes referred to as Section 403 assistance.
6 3
The most recent example of FEMA's creative use of funds to
provide emergency shelter was in October 2005, in recognition of
the huge displacement of individuals and families caused by
53. § 206.119(a)(1).
54. § 206.119(a)(2)-(3).
55. § 5174(h)(1)-(2); see also § 206.110(b).
56. § 5174(h)(2); § 206.110(b).
57. § 206.191.
58. 42 U.S.C. § 5155(a) (2006).
59. § 206.191(e)(2)(i).
60. § 206.117(b)(1)(i)(A), (ii)(B).
61. Crowley, supra note 16, at 135.
62. 42 U.S.C.A. § 5170b(a)(3)(B) (Supp. 2007).
63. Section 5170b was originally enacted as Pub. L. No. 93-288, Title IV, §
403 (1988).
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Hurricane Katrina. Because of the massive disgorgement of
residents from their homes due to Hurricane Katrina, the Red
Cross began paying for hotel and motel stays of disaster victims
who had run out of resources for shelter.64 The Red Cross program
quite clearly averted a homelessness crisis in the days and weeks
immediately after the storm. FEMA took over the Red Cross
special hotel and motel program in late October 2005.65 FEMA
was creative, in that it took over the Red Cross hotel and motel
program to transition Hurricane Katrina evacuees from emergency
shelters under Section 403 of the Stafford Act to temporary
housing assistance under Section 408.66 Furthermore, evacuees
who had run out of resources remained in hotels and motels rather
than be moved to makeshift emergency shelters until other housing
or housing assistance could be secured.67
III. FEMA's FAILURES PRESENT AND PAST
A. 2005. Hurricane Katrina
Hurricane Katrina left a 250-mile path of destruction along the
68Gulf Coast. Fifty levee breaches or breaks in the greater New
Orleans metropolitan area, including three significant breaches,
submerged the area in water as deep as twenty feet. 69  Eighty
percent of Orleans Parish, ninety-nine percent of St. Bernard
Parish, and forty percent of Jefferson Parish were flooded. 70 Two
weeks later fifty-percent of New Orleans was still under water,7'
64. Crowley, supra note 16, at 130.
65. Id; Kevin McGill, Red Cross Turns over Program for Katrina
Evacuees to FEMA, THE ADvOCATE (Baton Rouge), Oct. 25, 2005, at B3.
66. Crowley, supra note 16, at 131.
67. Id.
68. RISK MGMT. SOLUTIONS, HURRICANE KATRINA: PROFILE OF A SUPER
CAT 1 (2005).
69. IVOR LL. VAN HEERDEN ET AL., THE FAILURE OF THE NEW ORLEANS
LEVEE SYSTEM DURING HURRICANE KATRINA 2-3 (2006); KNABB ET AL., supra
note 2, at 9; Hurricane Katrina Timeline, TIMES (Shreveport), Dec. 11, 2005, at
A4.
70. VAN HEERDEN ET AL., supra note 69, at 2.
71. Cecilia M. Vega, After Water Recedes, the Detritus of Disaster
Emerges, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 13, 2005, at Al.
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and the water did not completely recede for forty-three days.72 The
storm rendered over 100,000 families homeless.73
Approximately ninety-percent of the buildings along the
Mississippi Coast were destroyed 74 by storm surge believed to be
as high as twenty-eight feet.75 Water from the storm also
submerged large sections of Mobile County, Alabama.76
Approximately 1,500 fatalities were directly related to the
hurricane, with about 1,300 of these deaths in Louisiana.77 For
those who did not die from drowning or otherwise as a result of the
storm and the ensuing floods, evacuation was chaotic.
78
"Thousands of homes and businesses throughout entire
neighborhoods in the New Orleans metropolitan area were
destroyed by flood.",79 Seventy-three percent of all homes in the
areas most affected by the hurricane were damaged or destroyed,
with the majority of the lost housing being low-income housing.8 0
Katrina obliterated entire coastal communities in Mississippi.
g1
Many of these areas could take years to rebuild.
8 2
Many individuals failed to evacuate because of a lack of
resources and were removed or rescued through a combination of
federal, state, and local government efforts as well as efforts from
83private citizens and non-governmental organizations. Many of
72. KNABB ET AL., supra note 2, at 9.
73. VAN HEERDEN ET AL., supra note 69, at 3.
74. Around the Gulf, NEWS-STAR (Monroe, La.), Sept. 1, 2005, at B3.
75. KNABB ET AL., supra note 2, at 8-9.
76. Id. at 9.
77. Id. at 11.
78. Trymaine Lee, Fifth District: Stranded But Still Standing, TIMES-
PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Dec. 18, 2005, at Nat'l 1; Wil Haygood & Ann Scott
Tyson, 'It Was as if All of Us Were Already Pronounced Dead', WASH. POST,
Sept. 15, 2005, at Al.
79. KNABB ET AL., supra note 2, at 11.
80. Crowley, supra note 16, at 124-25.
81. KNABB ET AL., supra note 2, at 12.
82. Id.
83. A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, H.R. Rep. No. 109-377, at 111-12, 116
(2006), available at http://www.a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/27mar2006
1546/www.gpoaccess.gov/serialset/creports/pdf/hr 109-377/evac.pdf.
[Vol. 68454
A CRITICAL LOOK A T FEMA 'S FAIL URE
the rescued victims were placed on buses and airplanes bound for
shelters, hotels, and motels in all fifty states in the United States.
84
Generally, "[d]isasters affect low-income victims more
negatively than middle- or upper-class victims," 85 and Katrina was
no exception. The impact of the disaster was particularly
devastating on minority and low-income individuals and families.
Over 1,000,000 individuals living in those states struck hardest by
Hurricane Katrina lived in poverty prior to the storm. 86 More than
90,000 individuals in the affected areas had incomes of less than
$10,000 a year.87 Approximately one-third of the people who lived
in areas hardest hit by the storm were African-Americans. 88 Over
half of the poor African-American households in the affected area
did not have an automobile.89
Poverty statistics in New Orleans were even more abysmal
than the general statistics for the Gulf Coast. Almost forty percent
of families with children in Orleans Parish headed by females had
incomes below the poverty line. 90 Twenty-eight percent of the
residents of New Orleans were living in poverty prior to Hurricane
Katrina.91 Sixty-five percent of poor elderly households in New
Orleans did not have a vehicle.92 Thirty-five percent of African-
American households in New Orleans did not have a vehicle.
93
84. As of September 23, 2005, Katrina evacuees residing in all fifty states,
the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico had filed applications for assistance
with FEMA. Those numbers included 623 in Utah and 101 in Alaska.
Katrina's Diaspora, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2005 (Nat'l Special), at 24.
85. Phillips, supra note 12, at D18. Individuals in lower socio-economic
classes are more likely to live in areas prone to natural disasters, such as flood
plains, and are less likely to carry disaster insurance. Id.
86. ARLOC SHERMAN & ISAAC SHAPIRO, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY
PRIORITIES, ESSENTIAL FACTS ABOUT THE VICTIMS OF HURRICANE KATRINA
(2005), available at http://www.cbpp.org/9-19-05pov.htm.
87. McWaters v. FEMA, 408 F. Supp. 2d 221, 224 (E.D. La. 2005).
88. SHERMAN & SHAPIRO, supra note 86.
89. Id.
90. Avis A. Jones-Deweever & Heidi Hartmann, Abandoned Before the
Storms, in THERE Is No SUCH THING AS A NATURAL DISASTER 85, 95 (Chester
Hartman & Gregory D. Squires eds., 2006).
91. SHERMAN & SHAPIRO, supra note 86.
92. Id.
93. Id
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Approximately sixty-seven percent of the displaced residents were
renters.
94
More than 250,000 evacuees displaced by the destruction
caused by the hurricane ended up in shelters, and most left with
nothing other than the clothes on their back.95 The Red Cross
placed others into its "Direct Payment Hotel Motel Program,"
which allowed evacuees with little or no resources to stay in hotels
and motels paid for by the Red Cross until the evacuees could find
more permanent housing. 96 In late October 2005, as previously
discussed, FEMA took over the hotel and motel program, which
became known as the "Short-Term Lodging Program."
When McWaters v. FEMA, the first lawsuit against FEMA
related to Hurricane Katrina, was filed on November 10, 2005, the
plaintiffs alleged that FEMA "failed to fulfill its mandate before,
during, and after Hurricane Katrina." 97  The thirteen named
plaintiffs in Mc Waters, on their own behalf and on behalf of a class
of people similarly situated, alleged that FEMA had:
Failed to provide any temporary housing assistance to
certain individuals and families, including those with
disabilities, who applied for assistance as much as two
months [prior to November 10, 2005];
Failed to provide basic information to disaster victims
regarding the scope and conditions of the available
temporary housing assistance, including how they [could]
continue to receive financial assistance beyond an initial
three month period [after Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf
Coast];
Denied temporary housing assistance to individuals who
lived at the same address, but in a separate home as
another, unrelated, person who also applied for housing
assistance;
94. White, supra note 22, at 42.
95. McWaters v. FEMA, 408 F. Supp. 2d 221, 225 (E.D. La. 2005).
96. Id.
97. Complaint-Class Action for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief,
McWaters, 408 F. Supp. 2d 221 (No. 05-5488), 2005 WL 3038551 at *1
[hereinafter McWaters Complaint].
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Refused to provide additional temporary housing assistance
to families that, because of their size, were entitled to more
than the standard amount of housing assistance;
Required disaster victims to apply for Small Business
Administration ("SBA") loans as a condition for obtaining
FEMA temporary housing assistance; and
Imposed retroactively inconsistent rules regarding funds
some victims [received before November 10, 2005].
B. 1989: Loma Prieta Earthquake
Prior to Mc Waters, complaints against FEMA related to
FEMA's failure to provide temporary housing to victims of natural
disasters were not new. On November 15, 1989, a coalition of
over twenty San Francisco Bay Area organizations representing
low-income individuals filed an administrative complaint seeking a
high-level administrative review of FEMA's failure to address the
debilitating impact on low-income and minority individuals from
the Loma Prieta earthquake. 99  That disaster, "the greatest
earthquake to hit Northern California since 1906," struck during
the World Series between the San Francisco Giants and Oakland
Athletics, 00 killing sixty-three people, damaging thousands of
buildings, and destroying 1,018 homes and 366 businesses.' 0
The administrative petition protested:
(1) FEMA's failure to provide adequate temporary housing
assistance for thousands of earthquake victims; (2)
FEMA's discriminatory treatment of residential hotel
tenants and seasonal workers, including improperly
restrictive eligibility requirements and payment of only half
or one-third the rental relief provided to other earthquake
98. Id.
99. Petition to Federal Emergency Management Agency---An Impending
Disaster: FEMA's Neglect of Low-Income Earthquake Victims (Nov. 15, 1989),
available at http://www.pilpca.org/docs/Petit.Loma.Prieta.pdf [hereinafter
Impending Disaster].
100. TIDES FOUNDATION, FIFTEEN SECONDS: THE GREAT CALIFORNIA
EARTHQUAKE OF 1989, at 10 (1989).
101. Ingfei Chen, Controller Says FEMA Still Lags in Quake Aid, S.F.
CHRON., Oct. 16, 1992, at A19.
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victims; (3) FEMA's deficient application, appeal, and
outreach procedures, including failures to inform applicants
of their rights and to provide bilingual services; and (4)
FEMA's failure to help coordinate, plan, and provide for
urgently needed replacement housing. 0 2
The Loma Prieta earthquake made 16,000 housing units
unlivable in the combined Monterrey-San Francisco Bay Area,
including 13,000 in the Bay Area alone. 10 3 Much of the low-
income housing in Oakland, San Francisco, Santa Cruz,
Watsonville, and other disaster areas was damaged or destroyed. 0
4
The petition warned that absent changes in FEMA's management
of the housing issues created by the disaster, a housing catastrophe
was about to occur. 10 5 At least 18,200 houses and apartments were
rendered unlivable, according to the petition, adding thousands of
homeless residents to the approximately 45,000 individuals
homeless in the Bay Area before the earthquake. 106
The emergency appeared to be even more catastrophic for low-
income individuals. According to the Association of Bay-Area
Governments (ABAG), the Bay Area had a shortage of 56,700
housing units affordable to very low-income households prior to
the earthquake. 0 7  This situation was exacerbated by the
earthquake. The earthquake ruined over a dozen single-room-
occupancy hotels and low-income apartment buildings in Oakland
totaling approximately 1,500 units.'0 8 These buildings were "the
last affordable housing resource for many minority and elderly
residents in an urban community [of] high property values, high
rents, and few options for those at the bottom of the income
102. Impending Disaster, supra note 99, at 1.
103. Ass'N OF BAY AREA Gov'TS, THE PROBLEM: LOMA PRIETA AND
NORTHRIDGE WERE A WAKE-UP CALL 2 (2003), http://www.abag.ca.gov/
bayarea/eqmaps/nightmare/problem2003.pdf [hereinafter THE PROBLEM].
104. Impending Disaster, supra note 99, at 2.
105. Id. at 6.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 7.
108. Eugenie L. Birch, Learning from Past Disasters, in REBUILDING, supra
note 3, at 132, 139; Kevin Fagan, With Push from Activists, Loma Prieta Stirred
Low Income Housing Renaissance, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 3, 2005, at Al.
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ladder." 1° 9 Two thousand, five hundred low-income residents thus
were forced to seek refuge in crowded Red Cross shelters or
crowded homes of friends or relatives." 10 Unfortunately, FEMA's
programs are "geared toward the single family homeowner, [with]
little funding available.., for multifamily buildings.""'
Fearing that disaster-related homelessness would become a
permanent and irrevocable feature in the Bay Area, the petitioners
cited specific problems in communities that would cause that
outcome absent a commitment by FEMA to make post-disaster
affordable temporary and permanent housing available. For
example, petitioners noted Oakland Housing Authority's long
waiting list for Section 8 housing." 2 The ABAG reported that
Oakland had a pre-disaster shortage of 2,662 units that people with
very low income could afford."'
The earthquake damaged or destroyed 2,860 residences and
400 residential hotel units in the Santa Cruz-Watsonville area.'
14
Santa Cruz lost its entire downtown." 5  The agricultural
community of Watsonville, which had a pre-disaster population of
30,000, lost eight to ten percent of its housing stock, seventy-five
percent of which was low-cost housing units. 116 As a result of the
enormous loss of housing stock in an already tight housing market,
victims of the earthquake in the Santa Cruz-Watsonville area were
forced to seek emergency shelter with friends or relatives and
create makeshift tent cities that housed over 1,200 individuals."
17
The petition alleged that landlords turned away low-income
families from the scarce available housing units because those
landlords feared that such families had either insufficient income
109. Mary C. Comerio, Housing Repair and Reconstruction After the
Earthquake, in THE LOMA PRIETA, CALIFORNIA, EARTHQUAKE OF OCTOBER 17,
1989: BUILDING STRucTuREs C161, C161 (Mehmet Celebi ed., 1998), available
at http://pubs.usgs.gov/pp/pp 1552/pp 1552c/pp 1552c.pdf.
110. Id.; Fagan, supra note 108.
111. Comerio, supra note 109, at C 162.
112. Impending Disaster, supra note 99, at 7.
113. Id. at 8.
114. Id.
115. Birch, supra note 108, at 139.
116. Comerio, supra note 109, at C 162.
117. Impending Disaster, supra note 99, at 8; Phillips, supra note 12, at D17,
D22.
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to pay rent or believed that those families were too large to
accommodate. 18
The petition further alleged that FEMA initially wanted to wait
to provide temporary housing in the Santa Cruz-Watsonville area
until it could determine if the existing housing was sufficient.
Local officials had to intervene in early November 1989 to
convince FEMA to send what could be termed only as a woefully
inadequate 122 mobile homes."19 Two years later, eighteen-
percent of the multifamily dwellings had not been rebuilt or
repaired, and "complete recovery took almost seven years.''
20
The petition set forth the following dismal statistics for San
Francisco. The ABAG estimated that the city was 5,617 units
short of low-income housing before the earthquake. 12 1  The
disaster destroyed or damaged 3,500 low- and moderate-income
housing units. 122  Nine hundred eight of those units were
immediately declared unsafe for occupancy.' 23 Within one month
of the disaster, seven apartment buildings containing 282 units
were demolished. 124 The earthquake damaged at least four hotels
that served very low-income residents. 1
25
The preceding discussion illustrates that low-income
individuals in the Bay Area were affected by the "no room at the
inn" syndrome after the earthquake. With winter approaching,
low-income residents faced a disaster-housing market that had no
room and worse had no easily accessible, affordable housing. One
might ask: How could policies and decisions by FEMA, the agency
mandated to meet the needs of individual disaster victims,
adversely affect low-income victims, arguably the hardest hit by
the Bay Area earthquake?
The answer, at least to advocates representing low-income
individuals throughout the Bay Area disaster region, lay in
FEMA's failure to fulfill its statutory obligations to assist low-
118. Impending Disaster, supra note 99, at 8.
119. Phillips, supra note 12, at D24.
120. THE PROBLEM, supra note 103, at 5.
121. Impending Disaster, supra note 99, at 9.
122. Id. at 8.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 9.
125. Id.
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income individuals affected by the earthquake. For example, the
advocates pointed out that FEMA officials claimed, despite
evidence to the contrary, that affordable replacement housing was
available to low-income residents displaced by the earthquake.
126
The essence of the criticism leveled against FEMA officials related
to the failure to realistically assess and address the substantial loss
of low-income housing stock in the Bay Area. 1
27
Critics lambasted FEMA for apparently concluding that despite
the loss of thousands of low-income units due to the earthquake, no
additional replacement housing was needed in the Bay Area
because, according to FEMA, sufficient units existed within a
twenty-five to fifty-mile radius of the disaster. 128 That conclusion,
if true, did not factor in problems faced by an overwhelming
majority of low-income residents. Many Bay Area residents did
not own vehicles and were dependent on public transportation to
get to work. 129  It would seem counterintuitive from a policy
perspective to dislocate victims of a disaster and move them to
geographical areas that did not have access to public
transportation.
In the petition, advocates raised more salient questions
regarding FEMA's apparent conclusion that affordable housing
was available within a twenty-five to fifty-mile radius of the
disaster. Would a move to potentially unoccupied units within a
twenty-five to fifty-mile radius of the disaster be economical after
factoring in daily transportation costs? 130 In areas where the pre-
disaster housing market was already tight, would rents not rise as
displaced residents moved into an already tight housing market? 13 1
Would a potentially large increase in rents displace tenants who
were not previously displaced? 32
The coalition's petition raised many troubling question§ that
were not immediately resolved by FEMA. The coalition hoped
that FEMA, on its own, would change policies and practices and
126. Id.
127. Id. at 9-10.
128. Id. at 10.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 11.
131. Id. at 13.
132. Id. at 11.
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thus avert what critics of FEMA asserted was a foreseeable crisis
that would be exacerbated by FEMA's mismanagement.
While the coalition sought an administrative review as an
alternative to litigation, litigation against FEMA was eventually
initiated to challenge the systematic failures of FEMA. 133  The
class action complaint for injunctive and declaratory relief also
sought relief against the California Department of Social Services
(DSS) for violating the Stafford Act in its administration of the
IFGP, which reimbursed individuals for personal possessions lost
or damaged by the earthquake. 1
34
With respect to FEMA, the class action complaint alleged that
FEMA failures violated the Stafford Act and the United States
Constitution. 135 The statutory and constitutional claims asserted
that (1) FEMA adopted policies that prevented low-income victims
from receiving temporary housing assistance; 136 (2) FEMA had no
formal review and appeal process; and (3) FEMA failed to tell
successful applicants about all the benefits to which they were
entitled. 117
With respect to DSS, the plaintiffs raised statutory and
constitutional claims. The plaintiffs alleged that while the Stafford
Act specifically stated that applicants have sixty days to appeal any
decision by FEMA, DSS had granted applicants only twenty days
to appeal an IFGP denial or award determination.' 38 Shortly after
133. Class Action Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, Jimmie
Smith v. FEMA, No. C-90-0161 EFL (N.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 1990), available at
http://www.pilpca.org/docs/Smith.v.FEMA.Complaint.pdf [hereinafter Smith
Complaint].
134. Id. 4.
135. Id. 3.
136. Id. One such policy was the shared-household rule. An example of the
effect of that policy is found in the following newspaper account. FEMA gave
disaster aid to a Watsonville family who had rented a house with two other
families before the quake. FEMA later demanded the money be returned
because one of the other families had already collected disaster relief. David
Tuller, Some Victims Find FEMA Help a Disaster, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 17, 1990,
at A4.
137. Smith Complaint, supra note 133, 3.
138. Id. 4.
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the Loma Prieta suit was filed, the plaintiffs and FEMA were able
to settle the dispute.'
39
As part of the settlement, FEMA agreed: (1) to the extent
requested by local governments and nonprofits, to fund
replacement of shelter units made uninhabitable by the earthquake
and to fund replacement of low-income housing units that
contained a private sleeping room in each unit; (2) to fund
reimbursement to local governments for special housing vouchers
for interim temporary housing for those denied temporary housing
benefits; (3) to provide housing assistance benefits to those persons
whose claims were initially denied under the shared-household
rule; (4) to inform those who did not initially receive notice of their
appeal rights; and (5) to promulgate appeal guidelines. 140
Despite the settlement between the plaintiffs and FEMA in
February 1990, criticism of FEMA's management of the Loma
Prieta disaster was renewed a year-and-a-half after the earthquake.
FEMA apparently had a change of heart when it learned that the
shelter units and other low-income housing it had agreed to replace
numbered more than 2,000.141 A coalition of community
advocates lodged a second administrative complaint against
FEMA, 142 alleging that "many Bay Area residents [were] still
living in homes with leaking roofs and unstable foundations";
many Bay Area homes had "serious structural damage caused by
the earthquake that [had] still not been repaired"; FEMA and DSS
had denied low-income homeowners "their fair share of relief';
FEMA's home damage inspectors performed "sloppy, incomplete
inspections," and spent little time in low-income neighborhoods or
with non-English speaking residents; "low income homeowners
often did not have their damages verified and were awarded little
139. STEINBERG, supra note 29, at 189; Settlement Agreement and Order
Preliminarily Approving Settlement, Jimmie Smith et al. v. FEMA, No. C-90-
0161 EFL (N.D. Cal. May 4, 1990), available at http://www.pilpca.org/docs/
Smith.v.FEMA.Settle.Agreement.pdf [hereinafter Settlement].
140. Settlement, supra note 139, at 3-4.
141. STEINBERG, supra note 29, at 189.
142. Petition to FEMA, et al.: The Continuing Disaster, Disaster Relief
Agencies Fail Low Income Earthquake Victims (1991), available at
http://www.pilpca.org/docs/Petition.FEMA.IFG.Loma.Prieta.Doc.pdf [hereinafter
Continuing Disaster].
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or no money for repairs" because FEMA inspectors were not
thorough; low-income Bay-Area residents "lived through two
disasters" because FEMA's practices never let them effectively
recover from the earthquake; and FEMA's and IFGP's price lists
used for awarding money were "far below actual repair costs" in
the Bay Area. 
143
Community advocates pointed with specificity to FEMA
failures that affected post-disaster housing for earthquake victims.
They alleged that the problem was twofold. First, "IFGP adopted
and FEMA approved a repair cost list with low, outdated values";
and second, "FEMA inspectors made cursory, incompetent
inspections and often reported damage inaccurately."' 44 As a
result of these failures, low-income homeowners continued to live
in substandard housing conditions. These examples of the small
amounts of money received by FEMA and IFGP recipients were
listed in the complaint:
In Watsonville, a single mother with a disabled child
received $10,588 to completely restore her heavily
damaged home. The cost for the materials alone was
$21,274.93.
An elderly couple continue[d] to live with light in only
half of their home and almost no heat. They ha[d] to place
newspaper around the base of their toilet to prevent
leakage. The Small Business Administration (SBA)
estimated that it would cost $17,054 to repair the house, yet
the combined IFGP and FEMA grant was only $1,212.
Another homeowner received $195 for real property
repairs for IFGP. Her chimney cracked and her fireplace
cracked and pulled away from her home. As a result, her
home flooded and received water damage when it rained.
The earthquake also broke the sewage lateral running
underneath the garage floor from the house to the street.
Consequently, whenever the toilet was flushed or someone
took a shower, water percolated up through the garage floor
and flooded it. Of the $195 grant, $130 was for patching
the damage to the plaster and the fireplace and $65 was for
143. Id. at Summary of Petition.
144. Id. at 2.
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replacing the toilet. Her toilet was not even damaged. A
licensed contractor estimated that it would cost over
$10,000 to remove and replace the fireplace wall.
One man received $2,878 from FEMA and IFGP to
replace 65 square feet of foundation, repair and replace
plaster, remove and replace the exterior chimney, trim and
refit two doors, and replace four square feet of window
glass. A private contractor determined that it would cost
$9,875 to fix only the foundation of [the] home. 145
A second major complaint was that "IFGP developed and
FEMA approved real property repair cost data, included in the
California State Administrative Plan," with prices much lower than
Bay Area market-rate prices, which made it "virtually impossible
for homeowners to make necessary repairs."' 146 An auditor for the
city of San Francisco's Budget Analyst office echoed the
complaint regarding FEMA's under-calculation of repair costs,
stating that FEMA used national indexes to estimate construction
costs rather than the higher local unit costs.1
47
The third major complaint lodged was that the inspectors hired
by FEMA and IFGP to report damage from the Loma Prieta
earthquake "were careless and incompetent" and that their
inspection reports "were cursory and unreliable."'148  Victims
reported to the Legal Aid Society of Alameda County that
inspections of their homes lasted no more than ten or fifteen
minutes. 149
The petition asserted that "FEMA inspectors were inadequately
trained to inspect for earthquake damage and often overlooked
damage that [was] typically caused by an earthquake."'' 50
Allegedly, inspectors frequently failed to check foundations or
roofs.' 51 The petition alleged that IFGP failed to award money to a
Watsonville family to replace their home's foundation because the
145. Id. at 2-3 (citations omitted).
146. Id. at 3.
147. Clarence Johnson, S.F. Short $220 Million for Earthquake Repairs, S.F.
CHRON., Dec. 10, 1992, at A24.
148. Continuing Disaster, supra note 142, at 5.
149. Id. at 5-6.
150. Id. at 6.
151. Id.
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FEMA inspector refused to look under the house, despite being
informed by the family that the floor was shaking.
152
The impact of alleged FEMA failures was especially felt in
low-income and minority communities. One report noted that "the
emergency response to the earthquake left many victims with the
perception that services were financially and racially biased."'
' 53
Inspectors were purportedly "inadequately prepared to work with a
racially and economically diverse population."' 154  One elderly
black gentleman reported that a FEMA inspector insulted him by
calling him "boy."' 15 The petition alleged that inspectors' "biases
against people of color and their fear and mistrust of low-income
neighborhoods caused them to perform superficial inspections in
minority and low-income residences."' 6 The absence of
translators for non-English-speaking people left the inspectors
unable to communicate with some victims. 57 These biases and
mistrust resulted in "more denials and low grants for people of
color and low-income people than for white and wealthy people,"
according to the petition.15
According to community advocates, the problems were further
compounded because inspectors were paid per inspection rather
than per hour, which gave them no incentive to be thorough.1
59
This combined with the biases and mistrust described above made
"the initial inspections an insurmountable obstacle for many low-
income applicants."' 
60
152. Id.
153. Comerio, supra note 109, at C162.
154. Continuing Disaster, supra note 142, at 6. Mary Comerio noted the
insensitivity problem extended to Red Cross shelter volunteers. She concluded
that the problem was "a function of the pool of volunteers (locally and
nationally) who are predominantly white and middle class and who have no
training in working with people from culturally diverse backgrounds." Comerio,
supra note 109, at C163.
155. Continuing Disaster, supra note 142, at 6.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 6-7.
160. Id. at 7.
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C. 1992: Riots, Wildfires, Hurricanes
Complaints regarding FEMA's failures in managing disaster
relief continued unabated through the early 1990's. In 1992,
public interest attorneys from California, Florida, and Hawaii filed
an administrative petition on behalf of disaster victims from those
states seeking immediate and high-level review of unlawful and
inadequate disaster relief by FEMA.161  The petition sought
"prompt corrective action in order to avert further, unnecessary
harm to disaster victims.'
162
The petition alleged that an obvious pattern emerged "[s]ix
months after civil unrest destroyed homes and businesses in Los
Angeles, more than two months after Hurricane Andrew
devastated communities in Florida and Louisiana and wildfires
raged through Northern California, and nearly six weeks after
Hurricane Iniki tore apart islands of Hawaii." 63 The petition
further asserted that FEMA's mismanagement "inevitably
compounded" the harm suffered by the victims of those and other
disasters, such as Hurricane Hugo in South Carolina' 64 and the
Loma Prieta earthquake in Northern California. 165  Specifically,
FEMA and the federal government were accused of having
161. Petition to Admin. & FEMA: FEMA'[s] Bureaucratic Disasters:
Unlawfully Mismanaging Disaster Relief from Florida to California to Hawaii
(1993), http://www.pilpca.org/docs/Petition.FEMA.Mismanagement.Florida.CA.
Hawaii.pdf [hereinafter Bureaucratic Disasters].
162. Id. at 1.
163. Id.
164. MICHAEL ALLABY, DANGEROUS WEATHER: A CHRONOLOGY OF
WEATHER 50-51 (1998). Hurricane Hugo struck Charleston, South Carolina, on
September 21, 1989. Five days after Hugo, federal officials had not provided
food and water to the rural poor in towns such as St. Stephen and Ridgeville,
outside Charleston. FEMA took ten days to open a disaster center in Berkeley
County, South Carolina. Nine months after Hugo, approximately 1,200 families
in South Carolina still needed assistance. STEINBERG, supra note 29, at 186.
Senator Ernest "Fritz" Hollings of South Carolina was so incensed by FEMA's
mismanagement after Hugo that he referred to FEMA as "the sorriest bunch of
bureaucratic jackasses I've ever known." Patrick S. Roberts, FEM4 After
Katrina, 137 POL'Y REV. 15, 19 (2006).
165. Bureaucratic Disasters, supra note 161, at 1.
2008] 467
LOUISIANA LA WREVIEW
delayed in authorizing certain benefit programs, delayed in
processing initial grants, delayed in implementing entire
programs for housing recovery and to avoid home
foreclosures and/or evictions, failed to supervise and
coordinate relief, denied applications for relief without fair
process, [and] provided exceedingly low grants for victims
in dire need .... 166
Petitioners alleged that FEMA failed to use fair process when it
denied or declared ineligible forty to fifty percent of the Florida
and California applicants seeking temporary housing assistance or
mortgage and rental assistance. 16 7 Petitioners also asserted that
less than five percent of the IFGP applicants had received
assistance in Hawaii, and that many victims in Los Angeles and
Florida waited for months to receive disaster benefits.' 68 Average
grant levels in each area were said to be "completely inadequate to
enable victims to actually replace necessaries and/or complete
immediate repairs on their homes."'
169
FEMA's practices were criticized as being in contravention of
the fundamental purpose of the Stafford Act, "to alleviate the
suffering and damage resulting from disasters."' 70  Petitioners
accused FEMA of failing "to carry out these obligations or
implement" mandates under the Stafford Act and "fail[ing] to
assure a coordinating and planning role for housing recovery with
federal, state[,] and local agencies and the private sector."'1 71
"Prompt review and action correcting FEMA's
mismanagement" was sought "to avert [alleged] further harm to
disaster victims."'172 The petitioners demanded that FEMA:
1. Adopt standards, forms, and practices to notify victims
of all available benefits;
2. Eliminate unnecessary delays in processing and
providing disaster relief;
166. Id.
167. Id. at 2.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 3.
171. Id.
172. Id.
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3. Eliminate inequitable and overly restrictive conditions
on the Individual Family Grant, Temporary Housing[,] and
Mortgage and Rental Assistance programs;
4. Provide continuing rental or mortgage assistance to
victims for up to eighteen months in the absence of
adequate replacement housing or in the wake of continuing
financial hardship;
5. Acknowledge the critical shortage of affordable
housing in the disaster areas and exercise full powers to
establish and implement a housing recovery plan with the
Departments of Housing and Urban Development and
Agriculture, other state and local agencies and the private
sector;
6. Provide fair and meaningful hearings in the event of
denial of assistance, and immediately grant aid to an
applicant when he or she cures the deficiency in the
application which formed the basis for the denial; and
7. Respond, with concrete remedies, to each of the
aforementioned grievances within ten days.' 
73
The circumstances surrounding the complaints related to
FEMA's alleged failures are noteworthy. On May 2, 1992,
following three days of riots and fires described as "the nation's
deadliest urban disturbance since the Civil War era," 174 Los
Angeles was declared a federal disaster area. 175 This declaration
qualified thousands of individuals from a broad spectrum of
stricken communities and ethnic groups for federal disaster relief
programs. Although FEMA was allocated $300 million for
disaster relief, 176 the petitioners asserted that "[d]espite the fanfare,
the promises, and FEMA's continued presence," in six months
173. Id. at 3-4.
174. Officers Tell of Confus[ion] and Indecision in L.A. Riots, S.F. CHRON.,
May 7, 1992, at Al.
175. FEMA, 1992 Federal Disaster Declarations, http://www.fema.gov/news/
disasters.fema?year= 1992 (last visited June 7, 2007) (listing all Federal Disaster
Declarations in 1992).
176. SENATE SPECIAL TASK FORCE ON A NEW Los ANGELES, NEW
INITIATIVES FOR A NEW Los ANGELES (1992), available at http://www.usc.edu/
libraries/archives/cityinstress/newinit/part8.html [hereinafter A NEW Los
ANGELES].
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FEMA disbursed less than seven percent of that amount. 177
Petitioners accused the federal government of failing "to make
good on the promised funds and programs to 'rebuild' Los Angeles
or even to begin meaningful recovery for thousands of individuals
whose livelihoods were destroyed during the fires and violence."'
178
A response to a request under the Freedom of Information Act
showed that FEMA "denied thousands of applications for disaster
housing assistance, including mortgage and rental assistance."
'1 79
The unrest left many Los Angeles communities crippled. The
County of Los Angeles estimated that 960 structures were
damaged and 613 were destroyed. 180  Property damage was
estimated to total one billion dollars.181  Dun & Bradstreet
estimated that as many as 4,500 businesses were affected and that
forty percent of the businesses damaged during the civil unrest in
Los Angeles had permanently closed.
According to a newspaper account, four months after the
disaster "[d]enial rates for nearly all of the federal grant and loan
programs [we]re running at 50 percent or more, leaving many
victims and their advocates with the sense that the aid process
[wa]s not working."'1 83  Of the 20,114 applications for disaster
assistance received as of October 22, 1992, FEMA found only
7,571 households (thirty-eight percent) eligible to receive
assistance.1 84 Petitioners criticized FEMA for denying over sixty
percent of the completed applications for mortgage and rental
assistance, as well as other types of temporary housing assistance
and alleged that several months after the riots, "thousands of
people [were] left without ... the prospect of any assistance."1 85
In Los Angeles, many homeowners whose businesses were
burned or destroyed feared losing their homes as well through
177. Bureaucratic Disasters, supra note 161, at 5.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. ANEW Los ANGELES, supra note 176.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Carla Rivera, Many L.A. Riot Victims Say Aid Hasn't Come: Half of
Applications for Relief TurnedDown, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 25, 1992, at A13.
184. Bureaucratic Disasters, supra note 161, at 5.
185. Id. at 6.
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foreclosure. 186 These homeowners alleged that they were denied
mortgage and rental assistance in some cases because their
businesses were funded with second mortgages. 187 Unfortunately,
as advocates pointed out, "[m]any victims were either uninsured
for their business losses or grossly underinsured."' 188  One can
easily imagine that the victims of the civil unrest wondered if any
meaningful recovery would occur for them in Los Angeles.
The petition asserted that in addition to its problems assisting
disaster victims following the hurricanes and riots, FEMA
responded slowly and inadequately when wildfires struck in
Northern California following six years of drought.' 9 The Dry
Gulch Fire started on August 17, 1992,19° and the Fountain Fire
started a few days later.' 9' The President declared the area a
federal disaster area on August 29, 1992.192 However, the petition
alleged that FEMA did not open a Disaster Assistance Center until
September 3, 1992.193
The fires devastated local communities. The Fountain Fire
alone destroyed 307 homes.' 94 Between the two fires, more than
82,000 acres, 267 buildings other than homes, and 600 million
board feet of timber worth $86 million were destroyed. 195
The petition asserted the following facts about the fires and
FEMA's ponderous response. Shasta County, hardest hit by the
fires, was "an isolated, rural area of primarily low-income
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 7.
190. Erin Hallissy, Wildfire Chars 2, 000 Acres in Mother Lode Country, S.F.
CHRON., Aug. 18, 1992, at Al.
191. Ann Bancroft & Edward W. Lempinen, New Major Wildfire Blaze near
Redding Is Bigger Than Gold Country Inferno, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 22, 1992, at
Al.
192. FEMA, supra note 175.
193. Bureaucratic Disaster, supra note 161, at 7.
194. Bill Wallace, Wind Gives New Life to Shasta Blaze: Firefighters Can't
Predict Where It Will Flare Next, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 25, 1992, at Al.
195. Id. See also Rick DelVecchio, 'Hotshot' Teams Contain Fire: Federal
Forces' Success Points Up Rivalries with State Agency, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 22,
1992, at A14.
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families."' 96  Two hundred sixty-two individuals applied for
federal and state assistance in Shasta County, and FEMA
processed their applications very slowly. 197 Many victims lived in
tents without basic necessities such as running water, toilets, heat,
or telephones. FEMA failed to notify applicants in writing
regarding their eligibility for benefits, and nearly two months after
the disaster, many applicants were still waiting for a decision. 1
99
The petition further alleged that "FEMA's benefit decisions
were highly inconsistent and arbitrary"; that FEMA workers gave
conflicting information regarding the types of available relief; and
that FEMA workers completed applications for the victims and
included incomplete or incorrect information, through no apparent
fault of the victims.
2 °°
The most stinging criticism leveled in the petition was that
despite FEMA's opportunity for advance planning and preparation
in Northern California, the relief effort was "plagued with the same
delays in initial relief, grant processing, coordination, and lack of
program implementation experienced by victims of other
disasters," highlighting systemic problems that "require[d]
significant changes by FEMA and the Administration to make the
program responsive to people's disaster needs.
' 20 1
The criticism against FEMA reached a crescendo when
Hurricane Andrew struck Florida with incredible force. Winds in
excess of 160 miles per hour and driving rains damaged or
destroyed over 130,000 homes and 10,000 businesses and left
350,000 people temporarily homeless.20 2 Overnight, hundreds of
thousands of Florida residents lost their homes, and their
surroundings became unrecognizable.
20 3
196. Bureaucratic Disasters, supra note 161, at 8.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 8-9.
202. DEMOCRATIC STAFF OF H. SMALL Bus. COMM., 109TH CONG. REPORT
ON TRENDS AND ANALYSIS OF SBA DISASTER LOAN PROGRAM 1992-2006, at 4
(2006), available at http://www.house.gov/smbiz/democrats/Reports/disaster
1oan2006.pdf.
203. Tom Morganthau & Karen Springer, Storm Warnings, NEWSWEEK,
Sept. 14, 1992, at 24.
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Dade County became a "zone of ruination that stretched on for
miles and miles." 20 4  The county was immediately declared a
disaster area,20 5 but help for the victims did not follow as quickly.
Newsweek described FEMA's relief effort as "brain dead., 20 6
United States Senator Barbara Mikulski of Maryland criticized
FEMA's response as "pathetically sluggish and ill-planned. 20 7
Three days after the hurricane and frustrated over the lack of help,
Kate Hale, director of Dade County's Office of Emergency
Management, held a nationally televised press conference. She
asked, "Where the hell is the cavalry on this one? We need water.
We need people. For God's sake, where are they? 20 8
Before Andrew, Dade County was an area where "population
outstripped social infrastructure." 20 9 The number of homeless in
the area before the hurricane was estimated to be from 6,000 to
15,000.2  Florida is dependent on migrant farm workers for its
agricultural industry, but the hurricane destroyed almost all of the
housing for migrant farm workers. 211 Even those people who
thought they were fully insured could not repair their homes
because they discovered they were underinsured; they needed
substantial assistance from FEMA to repair or rebuild.21 2
In Dade County, 63,000 homes were destroyed213 and as many
as 27,000 more were damaged or rendered uninhabitable by the
214hurricane. Many of the poor and elderly in Dade County lived
in mobile homes; ninety-seven percent of more than 10,000 mobile
homes were destroyed.21 5  The petition stated that those
204. Id.
205. FEMA, supra note 175.
206. Mathews et al., supra note 28, at 24.
207. David Tuller, FEMA Fights Mounting Criticism: Agency's Slow
Reaction to Storm Budget for Natural Disasters Assailed, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 15,
1992, at A3.
208. Mathews et al., supra note 28, at 23.
209. Id. at 24.
210. Bureaucratic Disasters, supra note 161, at 9.
211. Id at9-10.
212. Id at 10.
213. Mathews et al., supra note 28, at 23.
214. Morganthau & Springer, supra note 203, at 26. A total of 90,000 homes
were damaged or destroyed. Id.
215. STEINBERG, supra note 29, at 92.
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communities desperately needed "immediate temporary housing
and money to repair existing dwellings, until permanent
replacement housing [could] be built for residents and for the
migrant workers." 2' 6 The petition alleged that two months after
the disaster declaration, FEMA had "virtually ignore[ed] the more
extensive, long-term needs that [would] require building thousands
of units of affordable housing stock in South Dade County."
2 17
Instead, FEMA concentrated on short-term, limited forms of
assistance.
The petition asserted many other complaints regarding
FEMA's conduct following Hurricane Andrew. Although FEMA
belatedly agreed to provide hurricane victims with temporary
housing assistance, those checks were of little help when their
houses or apartments were destroyed or unlivable, scant housing
was available for rent, and rent for the meager available housing
skyrocketed after the storm. FEMA failed to notify those persons
who had already applied for housing assistance (approximately
110,000) that mortgage and rental assistance was available.
FEMA provided an inadequate number of mobile homes to the
victims.
2 18
Terry Coble, an attorney with Legal Services of Greater Miami
at the time of Hurricane Andrew, complained, "What we have
learned is that FEMA has a pattern of coming into a disaster area,
providing minimal relief and then folding up the tent.' 219 In the
case of Hurricane Andrew, FEMA quite literally folded up the tent.
The petition alleged that by the two-month anniversary of the
storm, FEMA had dismantled the tent cities that had housed
thousands, leaving no safety net for the hurricane victims without
adequate housing. 
2 °
Another complaint made by victims was that FEMA required
applicants for temporary housing "to apply for SBA loans and be
rejected in order to establish eligibility for federal aid despite the
applicant[s'] patently obvious inability to repay such a loan." 221
216. Bureaucratic Disasters, supra note 161, at 10.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 11.
219. STEINBERG, supra note 29, at 190.
220. Bureaucratic Disasters, supra note 161, at 11.
221. Id.
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Furthermore, elderly and uneducated people were effectively
denied assistance because they could not fill out the complicated
paperwork that FEMA required.222
The petition also criticized FEMA for ignoring its own
regulations that permitted interim assistance to victims with
insurance if they agreed to repay FEMA from insurance proceeds
when and if they received them.223 Instead, FEMA denied
assistance to the insureds, "even when they experienced inordinate
delays in recovering from the insurance company.
224
Three weeks after Hurricane Andrew, on September 11, 1992,
Hawaii was ravaged by Hurricane Iniki.225 Three of the islands-
Oahu, the Big Island of Hawaii, and Kauai-suffered significant
damage, with Kauai suffering the most extensive losses.726 The
entire state was declared a federal disaster area on September 12,
1992.227
Five hundred sixty-three homes on Oahu were damaged or
destroyed and over 7,000 Kauaians were made homeless by the
damage or destruction of 14,340 homes228 approximately one-
third of the homes on Kauai.229 Fewer than ten percent of the
almost 10,000 hotel and vacation rental units were habitable.23 °
In addition to those whose homes were destroyed by the
hurricane, many more were evicted so their landlords could make
repairs. Initially, FEMA provided vouchers only to those directly
affected; those evicted during repairs received no help. Not "until
222. Id. at 11-12.
223. See 44 C.F.R. § 206.191(c)(1) (2006).
224. Bureaucratic Disasters, supra note 161, at 12.
225. Nat'l Weather Serv. Cent. Pac. Hurricane Ctr., The 1992 Central Pacific
Tropical Cyclone Season, http://www.prh.noaa.gov/cphc/summaries/1992.php
#Iniki (last visited Oct. 28, 2007).
226. Id.
227. FEMA, supra note 175, at 1.
228. HAW. NAT'L GUARD, HURRICANE INIKI AFTER-ACTION REPORT 3
(1992), http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cgi-bin/showfile.exe?CISOROOT=/p4013coll 1
1 &CISOPTR=59&filename=60.pdf.
229. Tom Morganthau et al., A Quick Response to Hawaii's Hurricane Iniki,
NEWSWEEK, Sept. 21, 1992, at 51.
230. Bureaucratic Disasters, supra note 161, at 13.
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outrage over the policy forced FEMA to change it, some 10
months after the calamity," did those evicted for repairs get help.
23 1
As there was no rental housing available to the displaced
Kauaians, FEMA's remedy, five weeks after the hurricane, was to
provide tents, stoves, and lanterns, and to relocate the victims to
condominiums or hotels on the other islands. 23 2 FEMA did not
offer mortgage and rental assistance to Hawaiians until a month
after the hurricane.233
D. Failure to Learn from Mistakes
As the preceding discussion illustrates, FEMA's failures in the
late 1980's and early 1990's appeared to be numerous. After the
Loma Prieta earthquake, United States Representative Norman
Mineta from California complained that FEMA's response to that
earthquake was fraught with "confusion, constantly busy
telephones, misinformation and computer glitches."234  Sixteen
years later, the same complaints surfaced after Hurricane Katrina.
Senator Mary Landrieu stated in December 2006, "FEMA has
clearly learned very little from its mistakes, let alone basic math or
a sense of fundamental fairness." 235 The failures of the federal
government to provide disaster relief efficiently after Hurricane
Andrew may have forewarned of the bureaucratic disaster that
accompanied FEMA's response to the victims of Hurricane
Katrina. It is ironic that the government's slow response to aiding
victims of Hurricane Andrew may have contributed to the election
loss of then President George H.W. Bush in the 1992 presidential
campaign.236 It is equally ironic that over a decade later, President
George W. Bush had to acknowledge that FEMA's failures could
231. STEINBERG, supra note 29, at 190.
232. Bureaucratic Disasters, supra note 161, at 14.
233. Id. at 28.
234. Carolyn Lochhead, Rep. Stark Wants FEM4 Abolished, S.F. CHRON.,
Sept. 18, 1992, at A2.
235. Press Release, Office of Senator Mary Landrieu, FEMA: Mississippi to
Get Four Times More Housing Money Than Louisiana, U.S. FED. NEWS, Dec.
21, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 22356880.
236. See Michael Hoover, Rowboat Federalism: The Politics of US. Disaster
Relief MRZiNE, Feb. 12, 2005, http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/hoover021205
.html.
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not be ignored and were unacceptable in response to Hurricane
Katrina.
With thousands of Americans stranded for several days without
food, water, or electricity, it became difficult to comprehend the
United States government's lack of preparation and ineffective
initial response to a hurricane that had been predicted for decades.
It was particularly troubling to understand these failures in light of
dire warnings regarding the hurricane that had been given for days.
The enormity of the disaster caused by Hurricane Katrina
called for disaster assistance and relief by FEMA that would be
unprecedented in United States history. Unfortunately, FEMA
seemed to fail the victims of the storm in many ways. United
States Senator Susan Collins stated, "In Katrina, this system broke
down. And the result was the very deprivation and suffering this
structure was designed to avoid., 23
8
Problems with the Short-Term Lodging Program caused the
victims to "become pinballs in a FEMA game of rotating hotel
evictions." 239 The plaintiffs in McWaters alleged in their lawsuit
that FEMA failed to provide adequate information and temporary
housing assistance to victims of Hurricane Katrina; FEMA took
too long to open disaster relief centers where hurricane victims
could meet face-to-face with FEMA personnel, and other federal,
state, and volunteer agencies to discuss their disaster-related needs,
register for assistance, update their registration information,
ascertain the status of their applications, and otherwise go for help;
and FEMA failed to provide victims with accurate and necessary
information regarding rental assistance for which the evacuees
were eligible.2 4§
237. Tom Raum, '7 Take Responsibility", THE ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge),
Sept. 14, 2005, at Al.
238. Gerald Shields, FEMA Outlines La. Failures, THE ADVOCATE (Baton
Rouge), Dec. 9, 2005, at Al.
239. David Dante Troutt, Many Thousands Gone, Again, in AFTER THE
STORM, supra note 22, at 3, 20.
240. McWaters v. FEMA, 408 F. Supp. 2d 221, 225-27 (E.D. La. 2006).
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These alleged failures created among many evacuees a sense of
misery and lost hope. To many evacuees, FEMA had become
another bad four-letter word.
2 41
IV. LITIGATION AGAINST FEMA TO ENFORCE HOUSING RIGHTS
The preceding discussion illustrates the problems faced by
victims of natural disasters who are forced from their homes when
those residences are severely damaged or otherwise made
uninhabitable. While FEMA attempts to provide aid to individual
victims and families when these survivors are rendered homeless
and will not regain permanent housing for a significant amount of
time, victims who are left without homes immediately after a
disaster sometimes must turn to public interest attorneys to help
weave through an elaborate web of rules under the Stafford Act,
understand their rights under the Stafford Act, and protect those
rights when FEMA fails to provide adequate disaster relief as
required by law.
Taking judicial action against FEMA for disaster victims,
many of whom are low-income, to secure temporary housing
assistance is difficult, at best. The difficulty lies in the Stafford
Act's non-liability provision. 242  Pursuant to that non-liability
provision, the federal government is not liable for any claim based
on the exercise or performance of a discretionary function or duty
in carrying out the provisions of the Stafford Act. Because
Congress included specific language in the Stafford Act precluding
liability with respect to discretionary actions, absent a waiver of
sovereign immunity, a court would lack subject matter jurisdiction
over claims against FEMA for exercising a discretionary
function.2 43  The government of course would argue that the
241. Joe Gyan Jr., FEMA Rapped on Hotel Plans, THE ADvOCATE (Baton
Rouge), Feb. 24, 2006, at B 1 (describing a scene during one of the hearings in
the McWaters case in which evacuees and housing rights groups demonstrated
outside the courthouse carrying signs that read, "FEMA is a 4-letter word!").
242. 42 U.S.C. § 5148 (2006).
243. See Dureiko v. United States, 209 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2000), aff'd, 162
Fed. Appx. 976 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Graham v. FEMA, 149 F.3d 997 (9th Cir.
1998); Rosas v. Brock, 826 F.2d 1004 (11 th Cir. 1987).
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Stafford Act precludes all judicial review because all of its acts are
discretionary.
Does that bar of sovereign immunity actually preclude all
244
review of FEMA's decisions? In Lockett v. FEMA,24 a class
action lawsuit filed against FEMA after Hurricane Andrew, the
plaintiffs contended that FEMA: (1) failed to provide victims of
the hurricane with housing as required by the Stafford Act; (2)
failed to notify victims of the hurricane about the various types of
housing available to them under the Stafford Act; and (3)
implemented the Stafford Act and its regulations "in an arbitrary
and illegal manner by denying assistance based on a finding that
another individual in the pre-disaster household received
assistance.
'
"
245
The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief raising
• 246 s
statutory and constitutional claims. As to those constitutional
claims, the court opined that while discretionary acts are precluded
from judicial review, courts have jurisdiction over claims alleging
constitutional violations.247 The rationale for this conclusion is
that Congress has never "commit[ted] to an agency's discretion the
question of whether or not to act constitutionally" and that
"adherence to constitutional guidelines is not discretionary, it is
mandatory." 2
48
Thus, the Lockett court found that the plaintiffs asserted
constitutional claims over which it could assume jurisdiction. 49
Those claims were: (1) FEMA failed to provide temporary housing
assistance to otherwise eligible disaster victims as provided for in
the Stafford Act, in violation of the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment, by arbitrarily denying victims their entitlement
to assistance; (2) FEMA's policy and practice of denying
temporary housing assistance to otherwise eligible hurricane
victims based on a finding that another person in the pre-disaster
housing unit received assistance is contrary to the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fifth Amendment because the policy violates the
244. 836 F. Supp. 847 (S.D. Fla. 1993).
245. Id. at 850.
246. Id. at 851.
247. Id. at 854.
248. Id. (quoting Rosas, 826 F.2d at 1008).
249. Id.
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statutory rights of low-income victims to not be subjected to
economic discrimination; and (3) FEMA's failure to provide
victims with statutory and regulatory notices violated their due
process rights guaranteed under the Fifth Amendment.
250
The court's opinion in Lockett is important because it
substantiated a policy favoring judicial review of administrative
action. Courts, as a third branch of government, should presume
that they have the right to judicially review an administrative
action when a person suffers a legal wrong because of an agency
action within the meaning of a relevant statute. In the context of
the Stafford Act, courts should review the complaints of persons
adversely affected by actions of FEMA and dismiss only those
claims in the complaint that involve a discretionary function.
The defense of sovereign immunity was the government's
primary defense in the McWaters case, where the plaintiffs in
November 2005 sought a temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction challenging: (1) FEMA's authority to
unilaterally terminate the Short-Term Lodging Program; (2)
FEMA's application of the shared-household rule whereby many
disaster victims were denied temporary housing or other disaster
assistance on the basis that they lived or shared the same address or
phone number with another applicant for disaster assistance; (3)
FEMA's failure to grant temporary housing assistance to victims
because they refused to apply for an SBA loan; (4) FEMA's failure
to give timely notice to victims who received a preliminary
payment of $2,358 under the temporary housing provisions of the
Stafford Act that such monies were to be spent solely on rent and
that the failure to do so would prevent the victims from receiving
further assistance from FEMA; and (5) FEMA's delay in
processing over 80,000 claims for assistance that were still listed
as pending.
251
The government's response to the plaintiffs' claims in
McWaters was that the alleged acts and/or omissions were all
discretionary in nature and consequently immune from all judicial
review. 2 52 Amazingly, it was also the government's position that
250. Id. at 854-55.
251. McWaters v. FEMA, 408 F. Supp. 2d 221, 225-27 (E.D. La. 2006).
252. Id. at 228.
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FEMA may commit unconstitutional acts and omissions that are
likewise not subject to judicial review based upon the immunity
provision set forth in the Stafford Act.253 This incredulous claim
of statutory immunity from even constitutional violations is clearly
contrary to the intent of Congress and federal judicial precedent.
After conducting a hearing on December 9, 2005, regarding the
plaintiffs' motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction, the court, in granting the motion in part, held that
FEMA's sovereign immunity defense was precluded as to two of
the plaintiffs' causes of action: failing to notify victims that they
did not have to apply for SBA loans as a condition to qualify for
temporary housing assistance, 254 and arbitrarily cutting off
financing for victims staying in hotels prior to resolving their
assistance claims.255
With respect to the SBA loan issue, the court found that FEMA
had "either misinformed or not fully informed" applicants for
temporary housing assistance that they did not need to apply for an
SBA loan and that an SBA loan application was required only if an
applicant sought other needs assistance (e.g., medical and
dental).256 This finding led the court to conclude that FEMA
"violated a mandatory duty" under the Stafford Act "through the
mis-communication or inartful communication of the protocol for
receiving Temporary Housing Assistance by causing some
applicants to believe that an SBA loan application [wa]s a
necessary pre-requisite to receiving temporary housing
assistance. ' ' 5
The court was highly critical of FEMA in denying its sovereign
immunity defense as it related to FEMA's arbitrary decision to cut
off financing for victims staying in hotels prior to resolving their
assistance claims. The court noted that FEMA's actions in
reference to its subsidy of hotels and motels were "notoriously
erratic" and "numbingly insensitive. 258  The court was
"bewildered" as to the rationale for the termination of hotel and
253. Id.
254. Id. at 232.
255. Id. at 235.
256. Id. at 232.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 233.
20081
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
motel benefits and expressed disbelief that FEMA's termination of
benefits was directly aimed at victims who had virtually no
resources.
259
The court related the poignant testimony of one of the plaintiffs
regarding her struggles to find housing and justified its criticism of
FEMA with the following facts. The decision by FEMA to
arbitrarily terminate hotel and motel payment benefits was neither
equitable nor impartial as required by the Stafford Act. The
majority of the victims affected by FEMA's decision to terminate
hotel and motel benefits would have been the most disadvantaged
victims of the disaster. They were the individuals who "lost
virtually all of their property, economic livelihood, and in some
cases, family members as a result of Hurricane Katrina and its
aftermath. '' 260 Their plight was different from those who had
already received federal assistance and who had places to live-in
their own homes or with friends or relatives-or were able to
afford replacement housing.261 Most of the victims still living in
hotels or motels on December 9, 2005, had not been homeless
before Hurricane Katrina and were not living in those hotels and
motels by choice.262
While the hurricane did not discriminate based on economics,
those individuals with resources and access to alternate housing
were generally not among the victims who were living in hotels or
motels more than three months after the hurricane struck. Without
a doubt, the economic status of individuals in hotels or motels on
December 9, 2005, was in general far less than those victims who
were not in hotels. FEMA's decision to terminate hotel and motel
benefits for individuals who were disadvantaged by the disaster
violated a congressional mandate to provide relief and assistance in
an equitable and impartial manner without discrimination on the
grounds of economic status.
One can only imagine the anxiety and fear that many victims
living in hotels and motels subsidized by FEMA must have
experienced in believing that they might be homeless after having
259. Id. at 234.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id.
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lost their jobs, homes, cars, worldly possessions, and in some cases
family members and friends.263  The federal government's
insensitivity to this plight was both alarming and sad. The court
noted that the government on at least two occasions during the
hearing stated that citizens thought that "every problem in the
United States [was] a federal problem and that the federal
government [was] responsible for them. ' '264 While it is impossible
to know if the government's assertion is true, it is certainly clear
that Section 5121(b) of the Stafford Act makes the federal
government responsible to provide "an orderly and continuing
means" to help state and local governments alleviate the suffering
and damage that result from natural disasters. This sensible policy
undergirding the Stafford Act is based on these congressional
findings:
(1) because disasters often cause loss of life, human
suffering, loss of income, and property loss and damage;
and
(2) because disasters often disrupt the normal functioning
of governments and communities, and adversely affect
individuals and families with great severity;
special measures, designed to assist the efforts of the
affected States in expediting the rendering of aid,
assistance, and emergency services, and the reconstruction
and rehabilitation of devastated areas, are necessary.
265
In a later opinion dated June 16, 2006, the court in McWaters
affirmed its earlier decision with respect to the sovereign immunity
issue. 266  The court, in affirming its earlier opinion, rejected
FEMA's position that "under the aegis of sovereign immunity,
FEMA may commit unconstitutional acts and not be subject to any
judicial review.' 267 The court recognized that the Stafford Act's
non-liability provision did not expressly shield FEMA from
263. A Harvard study of Katrina survivors found pervasive anxiety and
pessimism. HARVARD STUDY, supra note 23.
264. Mc Waters, 408 F. Supp. 2d at 234.
265. 42 U.S.C. § 5121(a) (2006).
266. 436 F. Supp. 2d 802, 812 (E.D. La. 2006), aff'g 408 F. Supp. 2d 221.
267. Id.
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constitutional violations or violations of mandatory duties. 268 It
should be an extremely rare circumstance that would prompt
Congress to enact a federal statute that precludes judicial review of
colorable constitutional claims. The structure of our constitutional
form of government would be severely compromised or
jeopardized if Congress could act unconstitutionally and then
shield its action from review by inserting sovereign immunity
provisions that precluded all judicial review of serious
constitutional claims.
Perhaps the most important ruling made by the court in
McWaters was that under certain circumstances, victims of natural
disasters have a property interest in temporary housing assistance
created by the Stafford Act that is protectable under the Due
Process Clause.269 In making that ruling, the court had to
determine whether the Stafford Act or its implementing regulations
placed substantive limitations on the official discretion of FEMA
administrators or employees in their decision-making roles. In
essence, the court had to decide whether, under current regulations,
hurricane disaster victims who met the statutory qualifications for
temporary housing assistance were automatically entitled to
receive such assistance. 270  If FEMA had discretion to choose
which hurricane victims it assisted from among otherwise eligible
victims, it could insist that no constitutionally protected interest in
disaster assistance existed.
271
In finding that a constitutionally protected right to temporary
housing assistance existed, the court made the following
determinations: (1) FEMA by its own admission as an agency has
no discretion in providing temporary housing assistance to eligible
persons and families; (2) FEMA's provision of monetary resources
must be done in an equitable and impartial manner, without
discrimination on the grounds of race, color, religion, nationality,
sex, age, or economic status; (3) the Stafford Act provides that a
person or family is deemed eligible for temporary housing
assistance solely on the basis of being a person or member of a
268. Id. at 813.
269. Id. at 816.
270. Id.
271. Id.
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household who is displaced from a pre-disaster primary residence
or whose pre-disaster residence is rendered uninhabitable as a
result of the damage caused by a major disaster; (4) FEMA
admitted that all persons meeting the impartial eligibility criteria
established in the Stafford Act are entitled to temporary housing
assistance, and that all such persons would receive temporary
housing assistance; (5) most claims for temporary housing are
automatically determined eligible or ineligible by the NEMIS
computer system, requiring no human intervention or approval
such that eligible applicants essentially "automatically qualify" for
assistance and then are paid automatically via either a computer-
generated check or electronic-funds transfer; and (6) FEMA had
sufficient resources to provide assistance to all eligible
applicants.27 2
Because the mandatory and non-discriminatory policies and
regulations pursuant to the Stafford Act require FEMA to
automatically provide assistance to all applicants deemed eligible,
"a reasonable expectation of the benefit" of temporary housing
assistance is created.273 Thus, this "expectation rises to the level of
a property interest protectable under the Due Process Clause," and
as such disaster victims have a "legitimate claim of entitlement"
related to temporary housing assistance necessary to create a
constitutionally protected property right.274 Hence, the court found
that under the Constitution, by virtue of the automatic,
nondiscretionary assistance existing in both practice and the
Stafford Act and its implementing regulations, eligible disaster
victims have a constitutionally protected property interest in the
receipt of temporary housing assistance. 2
75
FEMA continues to argue sovereign immunity in housing
assistance cases with limited success. In Association of
Community Organization for Reform Now (ACORN) v. FEMA,
the court referred to FEMA's sovereign immunity defense as "at
best, a stretch., 277  In that suit, hurricane evacuees sought
272. Id. at 817-18.
273. Id. at 818.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. 463 F. Supp. 2d 26 (D.D.C. 2006).
277. Id. at 31.
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"declaratory and injunctive relief requiring FEMA to provide
adequate, written notice for any decisions to deny housing
assistance" and "the continuation, or restoration, of temporary
housing assistance until such notice and opportunity to appeal is
provided., 278  In Ridgely v. FEMA,279 a suit seeking to enjoin
FEMA from terminating Section 408 assistance without due
process, the court adopted the reasoning of McWaters in rejecting
FEMA's sovereign immunity defense.28 ° In Armstead v. Nagin,28
however, the sovereign immunity defense was successful; the
plaintiffs claims against FEMA for monetary damages were
dismissed because all of the acts complained of in that suit fell
under FEMA's discretionary functions under the Stafford Act.
282
The ACORN and Ridgely cases also addressed the issue of
whether the plaintiffs possessed a constitutionally protected right
to housing assistance. In ACORN, the District of Columbia Circuit
Court agreed with the McWaters court, finding that the hurricane
evacuees have "a protectable property right in the housing
assistance administered by FEMA, which cannot be deprived
without due process of law." 283 The Ridgely court found that the
plaintiffs, all of whom had been deemed eligible for Section 408
benefits, incurred a property right "with their legitimate claim of
entitlement." 284 The court stated that it saw "no relevant difference
between the plaintiffs' property rights to Section 408 benefits and
278. Id. at 28-29.
279. No. 07-2146, slip op. (E.D. La. June 13, 2007).
280. Id. at 5.
281. Armstead v. Nagin, No. 05-6438, slip op. (E.D. La. Dec. 29, 2006).
282. Id. at 6. The court noted that FEMA had reversed its denial of housing
assistance to the Armsteads and thus the plaintiffs' housing assistance claim was
either "moot, [wa]s barred by the APA until FEMA renders a final agency action
unfavorable to plaintiffs or fails to state a claim for violation of the Due Process
Clause because plaintiffs have a meaningful post-deprivation remedy for their
losses through the administrative appeals process." Id. at 7.
283. 463 F. Supp. 2d at 34.
284. No. 07-2146, slip op. at 6 (citing Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,
577 (1972)).
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those rights belonging to the plaintiffs" in cases involving Social
Security benefits, welfare, and public housing.
285
V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE IN FEMA POLICIES AND
PRACTICES
The administrative complaints and litigation initiated against
FEMA discussed herein were filed with the goal of persuading
FEMA to correct its mismanagement of disaster relief efforts and
avoid post-disaster bureaucratic blunders. One needs only to
observe what occurred with respect to FEMA's Short-Term
Lodging Program during the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina to see
that FEMA was ineffective. On October 24, 2005, FEMA took
over the Red Cross' "Direct Payment Hotel Motel Program,"
which allowed evacuees with few resources to stay in hotels and
motels paid for by Red Cross until such time as the evacuees were
able to find more permanent housing.286 On November 15, 2005,
FEMA announced that December 1st was the deadline for
evacuees to move out of hotels, although Louisiana's and
Mississippi's governors had the option of requesting exceptions in
287two-week increments. Some time after counsel for the plaintiffs
in McWaters filed an amended complaint on November 18, 2005,
FEMA extended this deadline to either December 15, 2005, or
January 7, 2006, with extensions being granted on a state-by-state
basis and depending upon the number of evacuees in hotels or288
motels in each state. Moreover, only the ten states that housed
the greatest number of evacuees at that time were eligible to apply
for the January 7, 2006, extension. 289 On December 9, 2005, the
date of the hearing on the motion for a temporary restraining order
and injunctive relief in McWaters, FEMA again modified the
285. Id. (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Thompson v. Washington, 497 F.2d 626 (D.C. Cir.
1973); Caulder v. Durham Hous. Auth., 433 F.2d 998 (4th Cir. 1970)).
286. McGill, supra note 65, at B3.
287. Sonya Kimbrell, Evacuees in Hotels Get FEMA Deadline, THE
ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge), Nov. 16, 2005, at B1.
288. Emily Kern, FEMA Says Evacuees Get Longer Lodging, THE
ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge), Nov. 23, 2005, at B 1.
289. Id.
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deadline.290 FEMA's vacillations, which the trial judge termed
"erratic and bizarre," were inexcusable. 291
To make matters worse, FEMA appeared to have a callous
attitude toward providing housing assistance to Hurricane Katrina
victims. FEMA's position was that every person ultimately had to
take care of himself.292 This position exhibited a high degree of
insensitivity, especially when one considers that approximately
two weeks before Christmas, many disaster victims had a very real
fear of being homeless during the holidays. 293  This degree of
insensitivity was extremely troubling when one considers that
almost three months after the storm 84,470 applications were still
deemed "pending."294  Furthermore, the decision to arbitrarily
cease funding the "Short-Term Lodging Program" was especially
cruel in that as of December 5, 2005, the number of hotel and
motel rooms being subsidized was approximately 41,800,295 and
FEMA admitted that it could not process all of the pending
applications by January 7, 2006.296
Judge Helen G. Berrigan was especially critical of FEMA's
attitude toward Katrina victims in the Ridgely decision. She
described FEMA's response to the victims' inability to understand
FEMA's "byzantine" procedures as "cavalier," stating that FEMA
appeared "to treat the plaintiffs' and their prospects of
homelessness and the despair and stress of such added worries as if
290. FEMA to Let Evacuees Extend Louisiana Hotel Stays, THE ADVOCATE
(Baton Rouge), Dec. 10, 2005, at IA.
291. McWaters v. FEMA, 408 F. Supp. 2d 221,234 (E.D. La. 2006).
292. Id. at 235.
293. One woman testified at the December 9, 2005, hearing in Mc Waters: "I
was panicking because I was going to be homeless. My nerves was bad; I
couldn't sleep." Jodi Wilgoren, Judge Orders an Extension of FEMA Aid, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 13, 2005, at A30. Another woman tearfully testified that before the
hurricane, "We had a life. We had stability. My son is looking forward to
Christmas, I can't even give him a Christmas." Kevin McGill, Evacuee Testifies
in Suit on FEM4 Hotel Program, THE ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge), Dec. 10,
2005, at B8.
294. Mc Waters, 408 F. Supp. 2d at 232.
295. Id. at 233 & n.1 6 (citing Declaration of Michael Hirsch, para. 42, Rec.
Doc. No. 32).
296. Id. at 235.
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[they] were gnats to be brushed away while the defendants busy
themselves with creating more bureaucratic regulations.
'
"
297
The bureaucratic bumbling with respect to the Short-Term
Lodging Program is but one example of the many blunders
committed by FEMA in disaster relief efforts since 1989. Another
example is FEMA's application of the shared-household rule.
As discussed above, under the shared-household rule, FEMA
treats everyone thought to be part of the same pre-disaster
household as a single unit for purposes of temporary housing
assistance. Hence, FEMA's policy appears to be that people who
live together in one residence before a disaster are expected to
continue to live together after a disaster. In essence, each pre-
disaster household is treated as a single unit in providing post-
disaster assistance.
This policy has been criticized as "based on middle-class
norms inapplicable in places where extended family members or
unrelated people teamed up to pay the rent."298  The shared-
household rule can have a disproportionately detrimental effect on
low-income victims of natural disasters who may be part of large
or extended families sharing a single home. If a large or extended
family shares a single home, is it reasonable to expect that after a
major natural disaster, one capable of destroying hundreds or
thousands of homes or an entire city, such large and extended
families would remain intact? In the case of major natural
disasters, families may disintegrate and become separated through
no fault of their own such that they are no longer able to share a
single household. If that occurs, what should FEMA policy be if
members of the same family are forced to evacuate in different
directions to different places?
The policy should be to apply the shared-household rule in a
flexible manner so as to not be rigid and punitive against large or
extended families. FEMA is authorized to provide assistance to
"individuals and households" 299 and thus is not prohibited from
aiding more than one household when disasters disintegrate
297. Ridgely v. FEMA, No. 07-2146, slip op. at 2, 6 (E.D. La. June 13,
2007).
298. STEINBERG, supra note 29, at 190.
299. 42 U.S.C. § 5174(a)(1) (2006).
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families such that they are no longer able to share a single
household. Hence, FEMA could treat such families as multiple
households for purposes of receiving trailer assistance or rental
assistance. This treatment of very large or extended families
would recognize that such households merit more temporary
housing assistance than a "standard" smaller household. Granting
more temporary housing assistance could also mean providing very
large or extended families with larger trailers instead of smaller
standard-sized trailers. Currently, FEMA specifications prohibit
trailers larger than fourteen feet wide or sixty feet long. FEMA
purchased 2,360 larger trailers after Katrina but left them to sink
into the mud in Arkansas because their size exceeded those
specifications. 
300
A rigid application or misapplication of the shared-household
rule can seem even more punitive if FEMA or some other
governmental agency has haphazardly evacuated families who
were victims of natural disasters by sending different members of
the same family to different locations. Finally, the shared-
household rule if applied rigidly or misapplied can result in the
denial of benefits to otherwise eligible disaster victims who are not
members of the same family. For example, if multiple unrelated
individuals or families lived at the same address, such as in a
multi-dwelling building, rooming house, boarding house, or other
common facility, temporary housing assistance could be denied to
individuals who shared an address with other individuals and
households who had previously applied for and received benefits.
Denying temporary housing assistance based upon the shared-
household rule makes sense to deter fraud in some cases.
However, presuming that everyone at a shared address must be
part of a single household for disaster-assistance purposes without
investigating the details could lead to dire consequences for
disaster victims. The plaintiffs in McWaters v. FEMA alleged that
FEMA treated the elderly or ill who lived with a caregiver, those
who lived in a group home, or those who shared a room or
300. S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, 109th Cong.
7-8 (2006) (statement of Richard L. Skinner, Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of
Homeland Security), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/Skinner-
021306.pdf [hereinafter Skinner].
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telephone number as part of the same household for purposes of
receiving temporary housing assistance. 30 1 One can clearly see
that the application of the shared-household rule under those
circumstances would appear to be punitive and result in egregious
hardship on low-income individuals. In that many low-income
disaster victims may share housing prior to a disaster to reduce
housing costs, it is not unrealistic to determine that these
individuals maintain separate households.
For example, in McWaters v. FEMA, plaintiff Beatrice
McWaters alleged that she was denied temporary housing
assistance because she lived in the same home as her brother and
mother, who had also applied for assistance, notwithstanding the
fact that she paid rent to her mother. 30 2 William Davis, one of the
plaintiffs in McWaters, was denied temporary housing assistance
allegedly because his brother, who had been temporarily staying
with him, applied for temporary housing assistance using William
Davis's address. Although William Davis had been in Louisiana
since Hurricane Katrina, he believed his brother was somewhere in
Texas.30
3
The problems with rigidly applying or misapplying the shared-
household rule can be exacerbated when FEMA applies the rule
inconsistently. 30 4  The plaintiffs in McWaters contended that
FEMA had waived the shared-household rule for some but not for
others.30 5 FEMA was criticized for allegedly changing the policy
while not publicizing those changes, leaving the agency free to
apply the policy inconsistently. Of course, such inconsistent
application could lead to due process violation claims by victims of
natural disasters. The due process violation argument has
particular merit because nothing in the statute expressly permits
the denial of benefits to individuals or families who, as a matter of
economic necessity, are forced to share housing with others. The
shared-household rule arguably is inconsistent with the Stafford
Act and could be deemed an administrative policy or rule that
301. McWaters Complaint, supra note 97, at 11-12.
302. Id. at 8, 32.
303. Id. at 15-16, 31, 32.
304. Cheryl Smith, FEMA's Flood Tide, AUSTIN CHRON., Feb. 24, 2006, at 31,
available at http://www.austinchronicle.com/download/2006-02-24/chronicle.pdf.
305. McWaters Complaint, supra note 97, at 54.
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frustrates the intent of congressional policy, which is to provide
temporary housing assistance to families and individuals who have
lost their homes because of a natural disaster and who do not have
insurance to cover living expenses.
306
In 2006, Senators Susan Collins and Joseph Lieberman
proposed changes to the Stafford Act that included modification of
the shared-household rule. 30 7 That bill was unsuccessful, but other
amendments to the Stafford Act eventually were enacted in
2006.308 One welcome amendment to the Stafford Act was the
inclusion of the cost of utilities and security deposits in temporary
housing financial assistance. 309 Katrina evacuees were unsuccessful
in obtaining this assistance under the previous language of the
Act.31
0
The 2006 bill required the FEMA administrator to develop and
disseminate guidance to the public on the types of housing
assistance available after a disaster. The bill also required the
FEMA administrator to report to Congress by July 2007 describing
in detail the creation of the National Disaster Housing Strategy to
improve coordination among agencies and better use federal
resources in future disasters. On July 31, 2007, the FEMA
administrator testified before Congress that FEMA was "making
significant progress in... developing a national disaster housing
strategy and improving operational planning for providing
temporary housing in a catastrophic disaster." 311 The changes
reported to Congress included developing the FEMA Housing
Portal "to consolidate available rental resources for evacuees from
Federal agencies, private organizations, and individuals";
increasing "the daily home inspection capacity of FEMA-
contracted firms"; pursuing capabilities to quickly double Internet-
306. 42 U.S.C.A. § 5170b(a)(3)(B) (Supp. 2007).
307. S. 3721, 109th Cong. (2006).
308. H.R. 5441, 109th Cong. (2006) (enacted).
309. 42 U.S.C.A. § 5174(c)(1)(A)(i) (Supp. 2007).
310. Watson v. FEMA, No. 06-20651, 2006 WL 3420613 (5th Cir. Sept. 6,
2006).
311. U.S. H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov't Reform, 110th Cong. 16 (2007)
(statement of R. David Paulison, Administrator, FEMA), available at
http://oversight.house.gov/documents/20070731105123.pdf [hereinafter Paulison].
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based registration intake capacity; and establishing a pilot program
to deploy "Mobile Registration Intake Centers" to shelters.
3 2
The 2006 amendments to the Stafford Act and FEMA's recent
initiatives are a good start, but much more needs to be done. To
alleviate some of the blunders that have occurred and will continue
to occur if changes in policies and practices are not made, we
suggest implementing the following changes:
(1) Modify the shared-household rule or its application so that
the rule does not unfairly discriminate against low-income victims
of natural disasters.
(2) Update all outdated computer and communications systems
that are used to process disaster assistance applications.
(3) Adequately staff toll-free phone lines to handle incoming
calls so that the lines will not be perpetually busy.
(4) Hire additional permanent staff, train them well, and
establish timelines to ensure prompt assistance where there are
substantial backlogs.
(5) Implement the recommendations of the United States
Department of Homeland Security Inspector General issued in his
statement before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs on February 13, 2006, to prevent fraud,
waste, and abuse of government funds.
3 13
(6) Implement major programs to save, repair, and replace
housing after a major disaster.
(7) Develop a comprehensive program with the United States
Department of Housing and Urban Development and the United
States Department of Agriculture to ensure that an adequate stock
of affordable housing exists after a major disaster occurs.314
(8) Eliminate unnecessary delays in the administrative process,
such as time-consuming SBA loan applications for persons who
clearly do not or cannot qualify for SBA loans.
312. Id. at 16-18.
313. Skinner, supra note 300, at 15-16.
314. The amendments include a pilot program to better use existing rental
housing in disaster areas to provide timely and cost-effective temporary housing.
H.R. 5441, 109th Cong. (2006) (enacted).
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(9) Develop procedures for notice of termination, pre-
termination hearings, and a navigable appellate process that
comport with due process.3 1
5
(10) Make available funding responsive to community needs
such as providing funds for rebuilding or replacing housing units to
state and local agencies and nonprofit housing organizations, as
was eventually done successfully in California after the Loma
Prieta earthquake. 3
16
(11) Fully leverage private and public resources to help
communities detrimentally affected by disasters in their recovery
efforts.
(12) Foster an environment of openness and honesty with
victims of disasters by sharing information in simple, clear, and
precise terms in an upfront and forthright manner rather than
hiding behind bureaucratic doubletalk, obscure regulations, and
loaded platitudes.
VI. CONCLUSION
Despite its assertions to the contrary, FEMA was obviously
unprepared to deal with the housing assistance issues stemming
from Hurricane Katrina. Even worse, FEMA acknowledged in
April 2007 that it did not have an emergency response plan ready
before the 2007 hurricane season,317 although by July 31 the
director stated he believed FEMA was prepared. 318 FEMA's
response to the housing problems caused by Katrina was
excruciatingly slow, which strained the patience of disaster victims
315. The court in Ridgely described the current process as "woefully
inadequate even by these modest standards." Ridgely v. FEMA, No. 07-2146,
slip op. at 7 (E.D. La. June 13, 2007). As one commentator noted in describing
the need for due process in terminating government housing benefits under the
strict liability drug policy, if poor citizens who rely on government housing
assistance are deprived of that aid, "it should be for the right reasons and done
the right way." Myers P. Namie, Note, Strict Liability Drug Policy Renders
"Innocent Tenants'" Homeless: Department of Housing and Urban Development
v. Rucker, 30 S.U. L. REv. 277, 288 (2003).
316. Fagan, supra note 108.
317. Hope Yen, Probe Calls FEMA's Pacts Waste, THE ADVOCATE (Baton
Rouge), Apr. 23, 2007, at Al.
318. Paulison, supra note 311, at 19.
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and indeed most Americans. FEMA's erratic behavior and internal
bureaucratic debacles were troubling when one considers that the
sole reason for the agency's existence is to assist disaster victims
in meeting crucial needs.
The human consequences of natural disasters reverberate long
after the events occur. Hence, it is imperative that Congress and
the executive branch reexamine and reevaluate the role of FEMA
to ensure that the agency deals with disaster relief as effectively as
possible. While many of FEMA's mandates are directed to states,
counties, municipalities, and businesses affected by natural
disasters, FEMA must pay more attention to the disaster assistance
needs of individuals and families most directly affected by
disasters. The legislative and executive branches of our
government and the American taxpayers must demand that human
beings who are the victims of disasters be cared for equally,
equitably, and fairly.
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